Showing posts with label Harvey Chochinov. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Harvey Chochinov. Show all posts

Monday, March 3, 2025

A History of the Italian way towards Euthanasia

Gian Luigi Gigli
By Professor Gian Luigi Gigli
University of Udine: Department of Experimental and Clinical Medicine. Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies (2013 - 18)

INTRODUCTION

The equivalent in sociology of the slow habituation process to poison, known in medicine as mitridatization, is called "Overton window". This is the term used by the American sociologist Joseph P. Overton (1960-2003) to describe the way in which, with the passage of time and under the push of appropriate actions, even very controversial issues can end up being accepted by the social body: It is a question of setting in motion a process that what was first inconceivable, gradually turns only into something extreme, to then become acceptable, therefore reasonable, coming to have the force of law, when it is sufficiently popular and shared.

Italian Radicals were masters in proposing paths of this type, leading the Italian society to add up to the most foreign ideas. In some ways this is part of the physiological dynamic of a democratic society. However, it is a dynamic that, if it does not want to contradict the same foundations of democracy, should stop on the threshold of fundamental rights, which cannot be questioned by the parliamentary majorities of the moment.

Thanks to the action of Radicals and Associations that refer to the radical ideology (primarily the “Luca Coscioni” association and its mentor Marco Cappato), the Overton window has been wide open on euthanasia and the ground has now become fertile for introducing the sweet death in the Italian legal system. If this change has been able to produce itself in a few years, it is "merit" of those who have carried out the long march for the introduction of euthanasia in Italy, a consistent project to demolish the moral resistance and legal obstacles together, using pitiful cases to introduce general principles in the system. At any legal success, the moral (and political) resistance came out weakened, in a vicious circle.

In the impossibility of reconstructing the whole story, it is necessary to analyze at least some fundamental joints.

THE NODAL POINTS OF A LONG MARCH

1. The judicial controversy and the death of Eluana Englaro.

The first can be identified in the judicial controversy that concerned Eluana Englaro. Despite the Supreme Court of Cassation, in the 2007 ruling on the case, had claimed that “the right to die” or the faculty "to choose death rather than life” do not derive from the Constitution, at the end of a very long battle, it was impunely ruled by a court the principle that also in Italy, like in other Countries, a human being could be left to die by subtracting her hydration and nutrition. And this on the basis of an alleged manifestation of will, reported by third parties and with discordant testimonies that could not enter into a discussion expertly brought to the civil and non-criminal justice, although it was a matter that questioned a human life.

2. Law n. 219 of 2017 on Informed Consent and Advance Directives on Treatment (Living will)

The second joint is constituted by the law on advance directives on treatment (ADT). In the name of an alleged absolute right to self-determination, with law 219/2017, each person was allowed to refuse not only cure, but also nutrition and hydration, and to do so not only when they are actually too burdensome for the patient or when they really represent therapies of the specific clinical case, but also when they simply constitute the indispensable supports to every human being, healthy or sick who is, to be able to stay alive.

In 2017, some of the topics considered by 219 (informed consent, shared care planning, refusal of diagnostic and therapeutic obstinacy, attention at the time of therapeutic desistance, palliative medicine) had already become cultural heritage of any good doctor even before the approval of the law, although it was still necessary to work so that they could become increasingly embodied values ​​in professional practice, in the awareness that is within the medical-patient relationship that the solution of difficult cases can be found.

The true and ethically more controversial innovations introduced by 219/2017 are instead: a) in the definition ex lege of hydration and nutrition no longer as elementary needs of the person (it does not matter if healthy or sick), but as medical therapies and as such refusable in any case by the patient, based on the absolutization of the principle of self-determination; b) in the possibility that the refusal can also be requested by those who legally represent the patient or the minor (parent, guardian, support administrator); c) in the provision of continuous deep (terminal) sedation to mask the suffering that dehydration and starvation inevitably produce; d) finally, in the legal approval of advance directives on treatment (ADT).

Already in the course of the parliamentary debate, which saw us strongly engaged, we warned that with L. 219 it would surreptitiously enter our legal system a sort of "right to suicide", albeit limited to death by dehydration and starvation, a right that by analogy could be dangerously extended with jurisprudential interpretations, if only to allow a faster and more "human" death, compared to that consequent to the suspension of vital supports.

The risks of an euthanasic drift due to the law approval on December 22, 2017 had also been announced with reference to what was appearing as a likely conclusion for the trial that met Marco Cappato (investigated after self-denounce since 1 March 2017) for having organized the journey of death of the disk jockey Fabiano Antoniani (known as Fabo), died in Switzerland on February 27, 2017.

Political forces and civil society did not want to realize the consequences of the new law. Also part of the Catholic world actively worked for its approval, among them Mario Marazziti, the President of the Health Commission of the Parliament and a prominent member of the Sant’Egidio Community. Others lived in the illusion that limitations in the application of 219/2017 would have come by its jurisprudential application. Punctually, however, the jurisprudence has proceeded to interpret the law in an extensive sense.

3. The (fake) trial for the death of DJ Fabo


This subtitle refers to what happened with the trial involving Marco Cappato, who reported himself for having helped the assisted suicide in Switzerland of Fabiano Antoniani (known as DJ Fabo). It is the third nodal point of this long march.

Despite the orientation against assisted suicide had been reiterated again in 2013, when the Supreme Court did not hesitate to rule that the choice of suicide is: "a denial of the fundamental principle on which every organized community is based, represented by the respect and promotion of life in all its manifestations," a few months after the approval of 219, promptly, the High Court in Milano who had the task of judging Cappato did not hesitate to complain that article 580 of the Criminal Code (which punishes instigation and aiding suicide) "is contrary to the principles of freedom and self-determination of the individual, enshrined in the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, which were recalled and declined in law on the end-of-life no. 219/2017". The Milanese judges relied on law 219/2017 to affirm that with the ATDs the right to suicide by renouncing treatment or life support has been introduced in Italy, legalizing in fact “indirect omission euthanasia”, even without recognizing the right to choose the methods of suicide. The fact that a patient cannot choose the methods of suicide, demanding that doctors administer a drug that causes death, “cannot lead to denying the … freedom of the person to choose when and how to end his or her existence”, based on articles 2 and 13 of the Constitution. In the opinion of the Milanese Court, therefore, the same “constitutional principles that inspired, only a few months ago, the formulation and approval of law no. 219/17 must also preside over the exegesis of the rule” under examination for the Cappato trial, i.e. article 580 of the Criminal Code, in the part that sanctions assisted suicide.

Contradicting the many Catholics who, out of naivety or personal interest, had preferred to vote in favor of the DAT, the Court sent the documents of the Cappato trial to the Constitutional Court, so that it could evaluate whether to declare the unconstitutionality of the part of art. 580 of the Criminal Code that concerns assisted suicide.

In the order with which the Court of Assizes of Milan brought the case to the attention of the Constitutional Court, the Milanese judges referred precisely to law 219/17 to argue that what differentiates Swiss assisted suicide from what the law had already permitted in Italy would be only the way in which the aspiring suicide decides to anticipate his end.

4. The interventions of the Constitutional Court

The fourth nodal point is the two-step response of the Constitutional Court to the order of the Milanese High Court.

First, with order no. 207 of 24 October 2018, the Court noted that: 

"The criminal legislator cannot be considered inhibited, therefore, from prohibiting conduct that paves the way for suicidal choices, in the name of an abstract conception of individual autonomy that ignores the concrete conditions of hardship or abandonment in which, often, such decisions are conceived. Indeed, it is the duty of the Republic to implement public policies aimed at supporting those who find themselves in similar situations of fragility, thereby removing the obstacles that prevent the full development of the human person".
At the same time, however, it invited to consider "situations that were unimaginable at the time the incriminating rule was introduced, but brought under its sphere of application by developments in medical science and technology, often capable of snatching patients in extremely compromised conditions from death, but not of restoring their vital functions". In cases, such as that of Fabiano Antoniani, in which the person is "(a) affected by an irreversible pathology and (b) a source of physical or psychological suffering, which he finds absolutely intolerable, who is (c) kept alive by means of life-sustaining treatments, but remains (d) capable of making free and conscious decisions", assisted suicide "may present itself to the patient as the only way out to avoid, in compliance with his own concept of the dignity of the person, an artificial maintenance of life that is no longer wanted and that he has the right to refuse".

The constitutional judges therefore adopted the similarity with what was provided for by law no. 219 of 2017, proposed by the Milanese magistrates (and inspired by the radicals), according to which the sick person has the right to refuse any treatment and the doctor is required to respect his will, noting that, despite this new legislation, the regulatory framework does not allow the doctor to offer the patient treatments capable of hastening his death. "In this way, the patient is forced to undergo a slower process, hypothetically less corresponding to his vision of the dignity of dying and more burdened with suffering for the people who are dear to him".

According to the Court, "the absolute prohibition of assisted suicide ends up limiting the patient's freedom of self-determination in choosing therapies, including those aimed at freeing him from suffering". For the constitutional judges, "the assistance of third parties in ending his life can present itself to the patient as the only way out to avoid, in compliance with his own concept of the dignity of the person, an artificial maintenance of life that is no longer wanted and that he has the right to refuse". After these considerations, the Constitutional Court chose to postpone the decision to the public hearing of 24 September 2019, to allow Parliament "any appropriate reflection and initiative". With a heavy and unusual intervention, it invited Parliament to address the end-of-life regulation within a year, threatening its own interpretative intervention otherwise.

One year after its own ordinance 207/2018, the Constitutional Court finally ruled on the Cappato case and in particular on the question of the constitutional illegitimacy of art. 580 of the Criminal Code in the part in which it criminalizes the conduct of assisted suicide, regardless of their contribution to the determination and strengthening of the suicidal intent.

Resuming the content of order no. 207, the Court reiterates that the criminalization of assisted suicide cannot be considered in itself in conflict with the Constitution and that the purpose of art. 580 of the Criminal Code is to protect people, especially the weakest and most vulnerable, who are going through moments of serious difficulty and suffering, avoiding that the decision to take one's life may be subject to interference by others interested in such an outcome.

However, according to the Court, it is possible to identify an area of ​​constitutional non-compliance, limited to cases in which the aspiring suicide is a person "(a) suffering from an irreversible pathology and (b) a source of physical or psychological suffering, which he finds absolutely intolerable, who is (c) kept alive by means of life-sustaining treatments, but remains (d) capable of making free and informed decisions". The Court reaffirms that, although Law 219/2017 recognizes the patient's right to refuse or interrupt any health treatment, even if necessary for survival, and the right to access palliative care and pain therapy, the legislation in force does not allow the doctor to make available to the patient, who falls within the conditions indicated, treatments aimed at determining his death, forcing the subject to slower solutions, unacceptable for him and a source of psychological suffering for the people dear to him.

On the basis of these considerations, the Court concludes that "if the fundamental importance of the value of life does not exclude the obligation to respect the patient's decision to end his or her existence by interrupting health treatments - even when this requires active conduct, at least on a naturalistic level, by third parties - there is no reason why the same value should translate into an absolute obstacle, protected by criminal law, to the acceptance of the patient's request for assistance that can save him or her from the slower progression resulting from the aforementioned interruption of life-support devices". As regards the risk of pressure or abuse on the most vulnerable persons, the Court notes that it sees no reason why those who are already authorised to forgo life-sustaining treatments cannot decide to end their own existence with the help of third parties, provided that the conditions identified by the Court itself are met.

According to the Court, in the limits of this context, the absolute prohibition of assisted suicide would constrain the patient's freedom of self-determination, deriving from Articles 2, 13 and 32, second paragraph, of the Constitution, imposing a single method for renouncing life.

Article 580 of the Criminal Code is therefore declared unconstitutional insofar as it does not exclude the punishability of those who, with the methods provided for by Articles 1 and 2 of Law No. 219/2017, facilitate the execution of the intention of suicide, autonomously and freely formed, of a person who presents the requirements described above, provided that such conditions and the methods of execution have been verified by a public structure of the health service, following the opinion of the territorially competent ethics committee.

However, the Constitutional Court's ruling 242/2019 does not represent the final conclusion. In the ruling, in fact, the Court did not establish any right to suicide, stating instead that "From art. 2 Cost. - no differently than from art. 2 ECHR - derives the State's duty to protect the life of every individual: not that - diametrically opposed - of recognizing the individual the possibility of obtaining from the State or from third parties assistance in dying". The Constitutional Court did not even cancel the crime of assisted suicide, limiting itself to providing for its non-punishability if certain conditions are met, including, not least, the patient's dependence on technological life support.

Furthermore, the Constitutional Court, in declaring assisted suicide not punishable, limited to the circumstances indicated by it, clarified in the same ruling that there is no right to be helped to die by the NHS, but rather a right to kill oneself, with the NHS remaining only responsible for ascertaining the conditions for non-punishability, the suitability of the drug and more generally the ascertainment of the methods of execution, which must be "such as to avoid abuse to the detriment of vulnerable people, to guarantee the dignity of the patient and to avoid suffering for the same" (Constitutional Court no. 242/2019, point 5 Cons. dir.). This is even more true if one considers that, precisely due to the lack of any obligation on the part of the NHS, the Constitutional Court does not provide for any conscientious objection for medical and nursing staff.

In addition, for the Court, the necessary effective offer of palliative care and pain therapy should instead represent "an absolute priority for health policies". "Otherwise, we would fall into the paradox of not punishing assisted suicide without first ensuring the effectiveness of the right to palliative care".

Even with these limitations, the intervention of the Constitutional Court undoubtedly represents an important step forward in the long march towards the recognition of the lawfulness of medically assisted death in the Italian legal system. In fact, sentence 242/2019 unspokenly conveys the idea that there are living conditions that are unworthy of being lived and which are better put an end to (for the moment as a personal choice); it spreads the idea that it is possible to solve the problem of suffering by eliminating the person who suffers; it confuses cure and care, forgetting that life itself is an “irreversible” disease and that “care” is always possible and necessary; it contributes to perverting the nature of the medical and nursing profession and the vocation to care of healthcare institutions; it aggravates the current tendency of healthcare institutions to intervene according to criteria of economy and efficiency and not according to criteria of humanity; it encourages those who are in difficulty and feel like a burden to ask to leave the scene; shifts even more towards the individual a society already weakened in its bonds of solidarity; subverts the foundations of the legal system, based on natural rights and favor vitae; destabilizes the balance of powers of the state with a very serious invasion of the judicial power in the field of legislative power.

Moreover, other disturbing questions inevitably arise. In fact, as happened with law 219/2017, which through the trial of Marco Cappato led to the ruling of the Constitutional Court, the ruling itself constitutes the starting point for new and more serious developments, inevitable for mere reasons of logic.

It is legitimate to ask, for example, what will happen to those who, in anticipation of not being able to decide, have entrusted the request for assisted suicide to the ATDs? In its ruling, the Court does not contemplate this possibility, referring only to articles 1 and 2 of the 2019, which do not speak of advance directives, but only of informed consent. However, how can the request for assisted suicide, advanced "now for then" using the ATDs, be rejected if the law on ATDs allows one to end life with dehydration and malnutrition?

Furthermore, what will happen to those who are not "aware and autonomous in their choices"? As with the suspension of hydration and nutrition, will the legal representative decide on the death of severely disabled and demented people (in their "best interest", obviously)?

Finally, how will we deal with those who, due to their motor limitations, are not even able to action the pump for intravenous injection or to crush between their teeth or swallow the legal cocktail? Will we be able to discriminate against them by denying them that it is someone else who performs the last gesture for them?

Logic is inescapable and leads to active euthanasia, beyond someone's "merciful" intentions.

5. The attempt of the abrogative referendum

With the wind in the stern for the climate changed by the unappealable judgments of the Constitutional Court, a further approach to the Euthanasic goal was attempted by its proponents, following two roads: that of the path in Parliament and that of the use of the urns of the referendum. Different roads, but complementary to each other.

The ambitious and unrealistic referendum project, served in fact only to create pressure on the Parliament for adopting a law to avoid the Far West that would be determined by the regulatory vacuum, produced in case of referendum repeal of the article of the Criminal Code sanctioning the homicide of a consenting person.

The referendum question, in fact, asked to repeal 18 words in the text of article 579 of the penal code, which punishes the murder of the consenting person. "Only" 18 words less, however, from the effect devastating: the murder of the consenting would not have been more prosecuted, unless the killing took place to the detriment of a minor, a person infirm of mind or affected by intellectual disability, or in the event of consent extorted with violence, threat, suggestion or deception.

In the event of a referendum victory of the radicals, the murder of the consenting would not have been more prosecuted, regardless of the patient's clinical conditions (suffering or not, irreversible or not), by the profession of the killing (doctor or not) and by the tool chosen to kill (drug, cushion, bullet or other).

The referendum chisel of the radicals, left to the work, would also have inserted in the law an unacceptable inequality between the crime of murder of the consenting (which would have been liberalized by the referendum) and that, less serious, of help to suicide (made not punishable only at certain conditions by the Constitutional Court).

6. The Unified (consolidated) Text approved by the Chamber of Deputies

From its side, only a year and a half from the approval of Law 219/2017 and in parallel to the referendum process, the Chamber of Deputies found itself to examine seven proposals of bills who aimed all, except one, to introduce medically assisted death in the Italian legal system, providing for "the non-applicability of articles 575, 579, 580 and 593 of the penal code to the doctors and the other health personnel" who caused the patient's death, as long as they exist the major age and full awareness of the patient, and if he manifests his will with a written act.

During their discussion, the bills were combined in a single text. The unified text leads the theme to the assisted suicide only, making the reference to the non -applicability of articles 575 and 579 fall (murder of the consenting).

On 14 January 2021, the unified text of the law project on "medically assisted voluntary death", speakers the Alfredo Bazoli and Nicola Provence, received an explicit endorsement from Carlo Casalone, Jesuit father, corresponding member of the Pontifical Academy for Life, in an article published in Civiltà Cattolica, the Jesuit magazine directed by Father Antonio Spadaro: "in the current cultural and social situation, it appears to me not to be excluded that the support to this proposal of law is not incontrast with a responsible pursuit for the possible common good".

On February 15, 2022, fortunately the Constitutional Court declared the radical referendum inadmissible, with an inevitable and legally flawless judgment. In fact, if the referendum had been declared admissible and if the radicals had won it, the foundations of the law and of social coexistence itself would have suffered the effects of an earthquake, coming out devastated.

Even when the ability of judgment is undermined by ideology, it is difficult to deny that the referendum question posed by radicals did not concern euthanasia, but the murder of the consenting.

In fact, it came out of the field of disease and medicine, erasing a fundamental concept with a stretch of pen: life, like freedom, is an inalienable good, even for those who want to get rid of it. As it is not legitimate to decide to become a slave to another, so you cannot deliver to others their right to life, however much these choices may be the result of a voluntary decision.

In fact, a written consent would not be enough to exclude that the request to die may have been produced following blackmail, pressure, economic difficulties, psychological subjection, momentary disheartening, depression. All things, these, who have nothing to do with suffering for a disease. Homicides, these, for whose execution a payed killed could have been hired.

But the decriminalization of the murder of the consenting would also have had other consequences. If, in fact, one can dispose of the supreme good of life, what sense would it make the ban on selling one's own organ for transplant purposes, or blood to pay for a debt? How to prevent a life sentenced from asking a cellmate to put an end to his suffering for the deprivation of freedom? If life is no longer sacred, why death penalty should not be admitted, at least for the most heinous crimes?

The above presented are considerations that do not require a particular legal culture. So what was a clearly improper referendum for? It is likely that the objective of the radicals was actually only to exert pressure on the Parliament, so that, to avoid the disruptive effects of the referendum, it approved euthanasic legislation.

Still only a week before the judgment of the Constitutional Court, the Hon. Alfredo Bazoli, speaker of the unified text under discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, did not hesitate to assert verbatim: "This law is the only alternative to the drift proposed by the radical referendum, which would like to legalize the murder of the consenting without restrictions" (Avvenire, 8 February 2022).

A week later, the gun of political blackmail was proved to be a toy gun and the inadmissibility of the referendum made the moral alibi fall, for those Catholic politicians and church men, who had argued that the rapid approval of the law on medically assisted voluntary death should be favored as a minor evil.

Despite the inadmissibility of the referendum, the large majority present in the Chamber of Deputies in favor of medically assisted death managed to approve the unified text on 10 March 2022 and to transmit it to the Senate for its approval.

The text does not even speak of assisted suicide, but of "medically assisted voluntary death". Ambiguity is most likely intentional, so that medical assistance does not turn "only" to the suicide, but can also practice actively. In the unified text, the death following medically assisted death is equated to that for natural death, in all respects of the law. It provides for the possibility of resorting to “medical assistance” even if the person is affected by "suffering" only of a psychological type, provided that they are considered intolerable.

Mora important, the requirement of an irreversible pathology is enlarged to includes the clinical "conditions" of irreversibility, that is, also the chronic situations of infirmity or those of irreversible disabilities (in the sense of permanent), but with which it is possible to coexist for a long time.

If this is added the failure to define what is to be understood for vital supports, it is inevitable to conclude that the approval of this text in the formulation with which it has gone to the Chamber of Deputies would not allow to deny medically assisted death also to the depressed or anorexic that refuse feeding, or to the demented no longer able to feed.

It is also significant the fact that a psychiatric evaluation is not considered mandatory, but it only said that the physician can make use of it while writing the certification ("report").

Finally, the bill that has now become known as "Bazoli", from the name of the speaker deputy, presents another fundamental flaw. The Constitutional Court, in fact, asked that the clinical conditions of the applicant and the suicide methods were verified by a public structure of the National Health Service, however providing that for the structures of the NHS there was no obligation to collaborate in suicide. At this stage, the legislator has exactly reversed things. In fact, according to the text, a verification of the NHS structure would not be required, being sufficient the declaration of the general practitioner or a specialist. Conversely, there is in the bill the possibility for the patient to request that the "suicide" occur in the structures of the National Health Service and that these are in any case obliged to ensure the performance of the procedures provided for by the law, thus including medically assisted death among the essential levels of assistance (LEA) that the NHS has to make accessible all over the country. Hence the need for the bill to recognize the right to conscientious objection. It is evident that in addition to the perversion of the medical profession, the finalities of the health care institutions are in the way subverted.

The approval of the "Bazoli" text would in fact transform the of solidaristic perspective of public health into a bureaucratic approach, making the medical intervention aimed at procuring the patient's death an ordinary protocol, elevated to the rank of the most noble interventions in medicine.

To temporarily hinder the path of the euthanasic project, the dissolution of the Chambers intervened on 21 July 2022, following the resignation of the Draghi government, which caused the early end of the XVIII legislature, causing consequently the forfeiture of all the legal proposals to the examination of the Parliament, not yet approved.


On the same day of the resumption of parliamentary works with the XIX Legislature (13 October 2022), the Bazoli bill was reappeared (Senate Act n. 104), this time with the name Alfredo Bazoli, become Senator, as the first signature among proponents.

However, the parliamentary majority change, followed in the elections, made much more difficult the coagulation in Parliament of a transversal bipartisan majority in favor of medically assisted death and this bill ended up on a dead track.


7. The introduction of assisted suicide through regional laws


Aware of this political difficulty, the “Luca Coscioni” Association has attempted to promote regional laws aimed at ensuring certainty of exam and execution times of assisted suicide procedures for the cases allowed by the ruling of the Constitutional Court n. 242 of 2019.

In various regions (including Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Tuscany) proposals of popular initiative have been filed, almost identical among themselves and corresponding to the type model prepared by Marco Cappato for the same Coscioni Association,. All the proposals also provided a widening of the tasks of the health service, that the Constitutional Court had limited to the verification of the existence of the required requirements and to the surveillance of compliance with the patient's dignity.

It is the attempt to bring suicide back into the organization of health services, which in Italy is competence of the regions. Operating a distortion of perspective of health protection, the Coscioni Association is trying to pass in many regions of Italy the equation of support for suicide to health care, charging the health service of the task of providing spaces, instruments, poison to be injected and medical and nursing staff for assistance, at the expense of the taxpayer, as if suicide would be included among essential levels of assistance (LEA).

Continuing in its aberrant logic, the Cappato bill claims that the expenses are not covered through the identification of specific resources, but by drawing on the same funds used for health in the terminal phase of life, not even it was a palliative care.

The severity of the Cappato bill lies in wanting to transform suicide from a tragic failure, with a limited area of ​​non-punishment for those who help the suicidal person, into a health practice, to be accepted on request, if the patient prefers it to care.

Fortunately, this project was rejected by the same regional councils and censored by the State Attorney because it uses the boundaries of regional healthcare competences, going to invade the exclusive competences of the State in the field of fundamental rights of the person. In fact, it is clear the unconstitutionality of a regional law in subjects, such as the civil and criminal code, which our system rightly reserves for State competences. In fact, a variety of legislation in the different regions would not be admissible on these issues.


8. What should be legally intended as life sustaining treatments

In the meantime, the Constitutional Court has produced a weakening of the conditions that the Court itself had defined in sentence 242/2019 for the decriminalization of medically assisted suicide.

On January 17, 2024, the Court of Florence submitted to the Constitutional Court the case of a patient suffering from multiple sclerosis in conditions of immobility except for a residual ability to use the right arm. The patient did not depend on mechanical supports, he was not subjected to life saving pharmacological therapies, nor did he require particular care interventions. The Florentine judge himself highlighted in the case in question the lack of the requirement of "dependence on life-sustaining treatments" provided for by the Constitutional Court. Nonetheless, the judge raised doubts of constitutional legitimacy with reference to art. 3 of the Constitution (for an unreasonable disparity of treatment between substantially identical situations), to articles 2, 13 and 32 co. 2 (for the compression of the freedom of self-determination of the patient in the choice of therapies), and to art. 117 of the Constitution in relation to articles 8 and 14 ECHR (implying an interference in the right to respect for private and family life that is not functional to the protection of the right to life)

On July 1, 2024, the Constitutional Court, rejected the question of legitimacy raised by the judge of Florence on art. 580 of the Italian Criminal Code, as amended by sentence no. 242/2019 of the same Court. Nevertheless, With sentence no. 135/2024, the Constitutional judges gave a new and wider version of what should be understood for life sustaining treatments, saying that: "The patient has the fundamental right of refusing any health treatment practiced on his body, regardless of his degree of technical complexity and invasiveness. Therefore, including those procedures that are normally carried out by healthcare personnel, and whose execution certainly requires particular skills subject to specific professional training, but which could be learned from family members or "caregivers" that take charge of the patient's assistance".

In addition: "To the extent that these procedures - such as, to resume some of the examples of which it was discussed during the public hearing, the manual evacuation of the patient's intestine, the insertion of urinary catheters or the aspiration of the mucus from the bronchial ways - they prove to be concretely necessary to ensure the performance of vital functions of the patient, to the point that their omission or interruption would predictably determine the patient's death in a short interval of time, they will certainly have to be considered as vital support treatments, for the purposes of applying the principles stated by sentence no. 242 of 2019”.

The extension of the potential suicidal audience is evident. It is no longer, as the Court itself has justified in its order 207/2018, a question to respond to "situations unimaginable at the time when the incriminating rule was introduced, but brought under its application sphere by the developments of medical science and technology, often capable of tearing patients in extremely compromised conditions to death, but not to return them a sufficiency of vital functions".

With another slip along the slippery slope that leads to euthanasia, from now on, to request medically assisted suicide, it will no longer be necessary to be connected to any machine, nor subject to invasive practices, becoming sufficient to motivate the request also the need for nursing practices as ancient as the world, such as "the manual evacuation of the patient's intestine".

9. The Tuscany Region approves the "Cappato” Law

The last (for now) stage of the long march of euthanasia in Italy was the approval, on February 11, 2025, by the Tuscany Region (as the first and - for the moment - the only Italian Region) of proposal of popular initiative known as "Cappato Law" which, however, will be challenged by the Government.

This law also passed with the indispensable vote of the Catholic regional councilors elected in the Democratic Party. Upon them the icy comment of the bishop of Pistoia, Mons. Fausto Tardelli, who did not hesitate to call things with their name: "As for Catholics engaged in politics, assuming that they still exist, at least sometimes they should not be afraid to go against current and pay attention not to lend themselves to games, mostly made to maintain power".

If unfortunately, the unconstitutionality of the Tuscan law were excluded, it is clear that with it, giving death would enter the DNA of medicine, while the healthy institutions would be transformed, according to the options, from places of care into places of intentional death.

Recently it has also been learned that in Lombardy, a Region ruled from the center-right coalition, a case of assisted suicide has been realized with the help of the health services, despite the fact that, unlike Tuscany, the attempt to approve a law on the Cappato model had previously failed in Lombardy.

PROSPECTS FOR POLITITIANS

When writing this article, it would seem that in the context of the majority of government that holds Italy, they are maturing reflections in favor of a national law, to prevent the regions from proceeding in a scattered order and that it can even start an internal suicidal tourism, on the type of that existing towards Switzerland.

Unfortunately, it is now late to circumscribe the phenomenon, which could still have been limited to exceptional cases before sentence 135 of 2024 of the Constitutional Court, which widened the concept of vital supports required for the decriminalization of the help to suicide.

However, it might not be late to exclude with a national law the assistance of the health services to suicidal procedures.

The political hesitancy with respect to a legislative intervention is due to the fear that despite its approval, the new law could be dismantled to pieces by the Constitutional Court, in response to requests from courts for specific cases, similarly to what happened for law 40/2004, regulating artificial procreation.

In his speech of September 11, 2019, the then president of the CEI, card. Gualtiero Bassetti expressed an extremely critical, albeit late, evaluation of the law on living will, coming to affirm that "well before the crime of suicide, parliamentary works should be dedicated to a revision of the advance treatment directives, approved with law 219, of December 2017. The provisions contained in that text, in fact, represent the starting point of a law favorable to assisted suicide and euthanasia". According to Cardinal Bassetti "Law 219 should, in fact, be revised where it includes assisted nutrition and hydration in the list of health treatments, which as such can be withdrawn; in the same line, the circumstances that the law establishes for deep sedation should be clarified and the possibility of exercising the conscientious objection to the norm should be introduced".

Unfortunately, such clear words were not pronounced in 2017, before the approval of Law no. 219, which was made possible only thanks to support of many Catholic politicians, inspired and blessed by important clergy members.

The truth operation, therefore, cannot ignore a sincere self-criticism of the harmful role played by prominent Catholics or, in the absence of self-criticism, by an indispensable change of the roles of responsibility that they continue to exert.

The battles, in fact, can also be lost, but those concerning crucial themes should at least be fought, if only to avoid that, together with the deep sedation of the patient, the consciousness of the people of God be anesthetized.

When Parliament will have to transform the contents of the Constitutional Court sentence into law, it is likely that it will only be possible to obtain the possibility for doctors to exercise conscientious objection. However, this does not exonerate us from taking a great educational effort, in order to develop a critical thinking in the clergy and among the faithfuls, of which there is an extreme need.

Together with it, as asked by the President of the Italian Bishops, "there is the need to strengthen the use of palliative care, whose importance is crucial in offering the necessary relief to the suffering of the patient". Palliative medicine, accompaniment and solidarity, in fact, are the most effective prevention of therapeutic abandonment, assisted suicide and euthanasia, even if they cannot be separated by correct anthropology. Without this anthropology, there is the risk that palliative medicine includes euthanasic intervention, as already happens in Holland and Belgium.

To facilitate the acceptance of the indispensable changes to the text of the law, it is now necessary that the Catholic world exerts pressure on the many parliamentarians declaring themselves as Catholics, to go beyond party obedience, operating choices not based on the emotion for a difficult and distressing case, but capable of looking at the long-term consequences of legislative acts, especially to the detriment of the most fragile persons.

Unfortunately, it is no longer even a matter of obedience to the party, but of values confusion, if a bill such as n. 104 (under evaluation at the Senate bears the name of a Catholic parliamentarian (Sen. Alfredo Bazoli) and if numerous others, among those who have co-founded it, also declare themselves Catholic.

Their consciences deserve to be re-proposed the careful reading of a recent, fundamental document of the Magisterium. This is the letter "Samaritanus bonus on the care of people in the critical and terminal phases of life" (published by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith on 14 July 2020, after approval of Pope Francis) (Link to Samaritanus bonus)

In this fundamental, even if unfortunately neglected document it is verbatim stated:

Euthanasia, therefore, is an intrinsically evil act, in every situation or circumstance. In the past the Church has already affirmed in a definitive way “that euthanasia is a grave violation of the Law of God, since it is the deliberate and morally unacceptable killing of a human person. This doctrine is based upon the natural law and upon the written Word of God, is transmitted by the Church’s Tradition and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium. Depending on the circumstances, this practice involves the malice proper to suicide or murder”.[38]Any formal or immediate material cooperation in such an act is a grave sin against human life: “No authority can legitimately recommend or permit such an action. For it is a question of the violation of the divine law, an offense against the dignity of the human person, a crime against life, and an attack on humanity”. Therefore, euthanasia is an act of homicide that no end can justify and that does not tolerate any form of complicity or active or passive collaboration. Those who approve laws of euthanasia and assisted suicide, therefore, become accomplices of a grave sin that others will execute. They are also guilty of scandal because by such laws they contribute to the distortion of conscience, even among the faithful. (Samaritanus Bonus V,1)

In the face of the legalization of euthanasia or assisted suicide – even when viewed simply as another form of medical assistance – formal or immediate material cooperation must be excluded. Such situations offer specific occasions for Christian witness where “we must obey God rather than men” (Acts 5:29). There is no right to suicide nor to euthanasia: laws exist, not to cause death, but to protect life and to facilitate co-existence among human beings. It is therefore never morally lawful to collaborate with such immoral actions or to imply collusion in word, action or omission. The one authentic right is that the sick person be accompanied and cared for with genuine humanity. (Samaritanus Bonus V,9)

The right to conscientious objection does not mean that Christians reject these laws in virtue of private religious conviction, but by reason of an inalienable right essential to the common good of the whole society. They are in fact laws contrary to natural law because they undermine the very foundations of human dignity and human coexistence rooted in justice. (Samaritanus Bonus V,9)
Those who feel impotent in the face of the tide that advances, it is necessary to provide support in order to resist to the equation of those who would like to reduce us to people incapable of compassion towards those who suffer, urging everyone to work to reduce suffering and not to eliminate the suffering.

The compromise at all costs, in fact, cannot be the mark of politics, the more knowing well that jurisprudential and administrative practice will move the bar further down. Instead, the fracture should be overcome between those who desperately seek mediation without a soul and those who want the opposition for the pleasure of being in contrast with the mainstream. Only in this way can we avoid abandoning the first to the betrayal of values ​​and to deliver the latter to ideologies that do not respect the life of all fragile subjects.

CONCLUSIONS

The dogma of absolute self-determination contains within it an iron logic of development. The final step towards euthanasia, which will make us like Canada, will most likely be written once again by the Constitutional Court, when it will be asked how it is possible to accept the objective discrimination that undoubtedly exists between those who are able to self-administer the lethal drug, although with the help of a health worker and with an injection pump, and those who can’t do even that. Without a leap of responsibility (cultural and political) and without a serious educational commitment, in order to meet the needs of these patients it will not be long before we officially open up to euthanasia (technically in fact it would no longer be assisted suicide, but the murder of a consenting person).

In ancient philosophy, with euthanasia, beautiful, quiet and natural death was indicated, accepted with a peaceful spirit as the fulfillment of life. It was something similar to the Christian "good death", the one that takes place in peace with God and with the brothers. Then came the desire for the "beautiful death", as a sudden death, of which not to notice, does not matter if without the possibility of repairing justice and reconciling with God and brothers.

The rejection of pain also came, that medicine had difficulty to soothe, now deprived of any redemption meaning.

Euthanasia began to be invoked with the new meaning of non-painful death, to be achieved by ending the life of a patient with the intention to avoid prolonged suffering over time. In the meantime, the eugenic movement also developed to impose sterilization to those whose reproduction would have added unnecessary burdens to the society in development, because affected by hereditary diseases or because belonging to lower breeds. Speaking of euthanasia and eugenics, there would be many prominent figures to be mentioned, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. I mention only the two brothers Huxley, Aldous (author of “The Brave New World”) and Julian (biologist and future president of Unesco). I also remember that there were those who prophetically anticipated the project of the atheistic philanthropy that was developing in their times. This is the case of Robert Hugh Benson, author of "The master of the world".

It was Nazi Germany, however, that combined euthanasia and eugenics with the elimination of "lives unworthy of being lived": mental patients, intellectually disabled persons, Jews, gypsies, homosexuals. And it was for the horror aroused by the Nazis that the euthanasic movement lost ground.

A ground that has been widely reconquered as a side effect of medical progress: today the problem is proposed because medicine allows patients with chronic diseases to live until their old age, while keeping in life patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness and procrastinating the death of the children with malformations who escape to eugenic abortion.

What to do with these lives also considered “unworthy of being lived”? What to do if, even among those who are not yet sick, the belief has spread that living with a tube or having lost the memory is equivalent to a condition unworthy of life, compared to which it is better to anticipate death? What to do in the face of the fear of those who simply prefer to remove the burden that their condition impose to others? What to do if, even on a public level, doubts arise about the opportunity to allocate resources for an extension of life, which is deemed futile? It is evident that here it is no longer a matter of physical pain, for controlling which, however, the development of palliative medicine has made great strides.

The battle against the introduction of assisted suicide and euthanasia, even if it were lost, will not be useless if it will force us to reflect on the risks of a man without God, totally master of his destiny. It is only a more fragile and afraid man, without a supreme guarantor and deprived of the pity of his fellow men. A man who to affirm his freedom of decision must deny its root itself, life. A man who proclaims himself independent, while he is dependent on social pressure and propaganda of strong powers, who establish what is good for him.

The story of Covid pandemic has already shown how dangerous it is if someone else should decide to what extent a patient has the right to the respirator and care. However, the decision taken on a clinical basis and taking into account the availability of the devices is certainly more democratic than the suspension of the vital support decided by a judge, by a guardian or a support administrator, on the basis of a fake pity or a negative judgment on the "quality" of life. Still, this is precisely what would inevitably happen to those who cannot decide for themselves, if the right to kill themselves or to be killed in the name of self-determination would pass for those who can decide how to end their lives.

More than death, there is a society to fear that is afraid of life and that decides on its quality and dignity.

It is necessary to go back to repeat today that every life is precious, if only as a teaching and warning for those who are healthy and carefree; to repeat that there are no live is unworthy of being lived, but that everything depends on the eye with which we look at them ("dignity is in the eye of the beholder", as H.M. Chochinov said). For this reason, it is necessary to re-propose a kind of medicine made of care, listening and relationship with the person who is alone, who suffers, who does not want to be a burden on others, who would only like to be helped while asking to die. It is this the deeper meaning of palliative care, capable of covering human suffering with the cloak (pallium) of the care.

The antithesis to therapeutic obstinacy is not abandonment, nor even less the intentional death, but the solidarity accompaniment.

Those who support social justice and solidarity should be aware of that euthanasia and assisted suicide risk being the opposite of self-determination, becoming only the cost solution for a society that does not want to take charge of the growing number of elderly people suffering from chronic diseases. It is therefore necessary to wonder if, even in Italy, medically assisted death has nothing to do with freedom, but with a wrong reply to need, isolation, despair. If it is not a matter of rights (the right to die), but of duties (the duty to remove the burden represented by those who are more fragile or vulnerable).

They should also wonder what will be the consequences of the breakdown of the relationship of trust that binds the doctor and his patient since the times of Hippocrates.

For those who are Christians, finally, it is necessary to return to witness that suffering and death are only the door for the resurrection

When my moment will arrive, I hope that the transition from this life will take place in the arms of Jesus, who with his suffering and dying has opened the doors of the new world, a world fortunately deeply different from that described by Huxley. 

More articles on the Italian euthanasia situation.

  • Bad news: Tuscany has legalized assisted suicide (Link). 
  • Italian woman with Multiple Sclerosis dies by assisted suicide (Link). 
  • Disabled man is the first Italian to die by assisted suicide (Link). 
  • Italian lower house passes euthanasia bill for people with disabilities (Link).
  • Italy's Constitutional Court rejects euthanasia referendum (Link). 
  • Italian assisted suicide court decisions focus on people with disabilities (Link).

Thursday, January 9, 2025

Canada Euthanasia – unmasking health care and social failures

Alex Schadenberg
Executive Director, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition

Dr Ramona Coelho
Dr Ramona Coelho is a Family Physician; Senior Fellow of Domestic and Health Policy at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute; Member of Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) Death Review Committee

Dr Coelho has written an excellent commentary on Canada's experience with euthanasia (MAiD) that was published by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute on January 8, 2025

Dr Coelho is commenting on Health Canada's Fifth Annual Report on Medical Assistance in Dying. Coelho writes:

Health Canada’s recently released Fifth Annual Report on Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada 2023 reveals that 15,343 individuals died by MAiD, 622 of them following Track 2. By the end of 2023, the cumulative number of MAiD deaths reached 60,000 – 4.7 per cent of all deaths nationally since the program was launched. The annual growth rate continues to rise significantly, at 15.8 per cent.

Regional reported trends highlight extreme increases in growth, with Quebec experiencing a 36.3 per cent increase, Ontario at 30.3 per cent, and British Columbia at 18.0 per cent. These provinces account for 85 per cent of all MAiD provisions. In Quebec, where only euthanasia is allowed, it accounted for more than 7 per cent of all deaths. Quebec’s government recently commissioned a study to better understand why so many people in the province are resorting to euthanasia.
Canada legalized MAiD (euthanasia and assisted suicide) in June 2016 by creating an exemption in the Criminal Code for homicide or aiding suicide. Coelho mentions that in 2023 there were 15,343 MAiD deaths whereby 5 of the deaths were assisted suicide while the rest were euthanasia.

Some of the MAiD deaths were based on discrimination, inadequate access to health care, mental health services, disability supports and social care. Coelho explains:
Supporters of MAiD often cite autonomy and compassion as validations for the practice. However, as a society, we cannot ignore the troubling reality that, for many individuals, the desire for assisted death can often reflect systemic failures: discrimination, inadequate access to health care, mental health services, disability supports, and social care.

Even the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA), which filed the Carter case that led to the 2015 decriminalization of physician-assisted suicide in Canada, has now expressed concerns about the misuse of MAiD. They acknowledge reports of individuals being offered MAiD in circumstances that might not meet the legal criteria, as well as cases where people may resort to MAiD due to intolerable social conditions, and have asserted that they will hold the government accountable.
Suffering was not necessarily related to physical suffering.
As the Health Canada report cites, the overall drivers of intolerable suffering include loneliness and isolation (21 per cent for Track 1 vs. 47 per cent for Track 2), emotional distress, anxiety, fear, or existential suffering (39 per cent for Track 1 vs. 35 per cent for Track 2) and a perceived burden on family, friends or caregivers (45 per cent for Track 1 vs. 49 per cent for Track 2). It is deeply troubling that loneliness, the fear of being a burden, and general fear are leading people to choose death. All of these issues should be addressed with better care, not with the provision of death. When people lack timely access to adequate health care, housing, or proper support – or even simply genuine care and love – offering death as a “choice” is not compassionate, it can be a form of neglect.
Euthanasia in Canada is often presented as an option when the person is at their lowest. Coelho explains:
Consider patients in palliative care. Cancer patients, for instance, often face significant barriers to accessing mental health support and proper symptom management. How can a request for MAiD be free and informed when better support isn’t available? Alarmingly, Health Canada suggests that health care providers should consider proactively raising MAiD as an option, but this approach raises serious ethical concerns. Are we genuinely prioritizing care, or are we normalizing death as a default?

This tension illustrates how systemic neglect can muddy the waters of autonomy. When cases of euthanasia are documented for persons whose pain is poorly managed, or whose care is inadequate, is the decision to request MAiD truly autonomous? When feeling like a burden, or when loneliness or fear of prolonged suffering are the factors driving the decision, the choices are not made in true freedom but are borne of anguish and desperation, reflecting the reality of unmet needs. These dynamics demonstrate that suffering can distort autonomy and can turn MAiD into the result of systemic failures rather than an expression of true choice.
Euthanasia is not a type of medical treatment.

MAiD does not align with medicine’s core purpose and has been incoherently integrated into medical practice. As Harvey Chochinov and Joseph Fins argue, medicine is fundamentally about healing, restoration, and tailoring care to address specific conditions. In contrast, MAiD offers no pathway to healing; it ends life, removing the possibility of further care, closure, or recovery. Unlike standard medical practice, which relies on evidence-based guidelines and individualized decision-making to manage symptoms and diseases while minimizing harm, MAiD is legislatively mandated, lacks nuance and adaptability, and serves only to end the sufferer’s life.

This overemphasis on autonomy represents a troubling shift in medical ethics. Autonomous choice, when stripped of adequate support and resources, ceases to be a form of empowerment and instead becomes a hollow justification for abandonment and the exercise of privilege and power over consideration of the common good. By focusing on “choice” while failing to address the suffering that underpins it, MAiD shifts the medical profession’s role from healing to facilitating death.
The expansion of euthanasia affects the nature of medical treatment.
The expansion of MAiD – from individuals who are near the end of their lives to those with disabilities, mental illness (beginning in 2027), and likely soon for those lacking capacity – raises profound questions about how we define medical treatment. Unlike other procedures, performing euthanasia or assisted suicide does not mandate any specialized training, nor are there legislative safeguards ensuring that all of the less invasive or less risky treatments have been thoroughly tried first. This begs the question of whether we are shifting the focus of care from alleviating suffering to merely ending the lives of those who are suffering prematurely.

Engaging in this debate has revealed an interesting dynamic among experts. Mental health professionals often highlight the complexity of their field and the current impossibility of accurately determining whose suffering is truly irremediable. Many argue rightly that MAiD is not an appropriate response to mental illness and advocate for evidence-based care. Disability experts emphasize that their patients often face systemic barriers and unmet needs and that recovery takes time, suggesting that compassion lies in improving support, not offering death. Palliative care specialists stress that end-of-life suffering can be alleviated, provided the resources to provide skillful, holistic care are available, which allows patients and their loved ones to find closure and meaning in their final days. While physical pain can often be effectively managed with medication, the psychological aspects of suffering should be addressed through therapy. Furthermore, choosing death out of fear – whether to avoid future pain, suffering, or material hardships – should be met with compassion and improved support.
The overemphasis of autonomy displaces the core principles of medicine.
This shift from the balancing of ethical principles of medicine to an overemphasis on autonomy reveals a deeper issue: autonomy and choice can displace core principles of healing, patient safety, and alleviation of suffering. Fear, isolation, and a lack of sustained support can make MAiD seem like an appealing option – not because it is the best solution, but because better alternatives are either overlooked due to the limited knowledge or are unavailable and inaccessible.
The report indicates that Track 2 euthanasia deaths (euthanasia for people who are not dying) predominantly affects women and people living with poverty.
According to the Health Canada report, those receiving MAiD under Track 2 were predominantly women (58.5 per cent) and slightly younger than those receiving it via Track 1. Further, the report indicates that proportionally more women than men were living in the lowest-income neighbourhoods (both Tracks 1 and 2). The Health Canada report aims to reassure Canadians by stating that the higher rate of younger women receiving MAiD can simply be linked to, “overall population health trends where women experience longterm chronic illness, which can cause enduring suffering but would not typically make a person’s death reasonably foreseeable.” However, the report fails to mention international research that women are disproportionately affected by intimate partner violence, more likely to receive inadequate medical care, and twice as likely to attempt suicide as men. These women may feel trapped in their suffering, leading them to see euthanasia or assisted suicide as an escape when other supports or interventions are unavailable, effectively replacing suicide prevention efforts with assisted suicide.

Lastly, an unexplained 6.7 per cent of those who died under Track 2 had no fixed address, raising the possibility of housing insecurity, a concern that has recently been underscored in leaked discussions from MAiD practitioner forums. These documented issues highlight that euthanasia and assisted suicide risks preying on systemic neglect and the intersections of gender, poverty, and isolation – conditions that distort the notion of true choice.
The Health Canada euthanasia report seems to promote the position of the euthanasia lobby.
The Health Canada report reads at times like a defence of the MAiD regime, placing greater emphasis on reassuring the public than on sober and fulsome analysis. The report even concludes with what seems like an endorsement for Dying with Dignity’s (DWD) position in a BC court case, which aims to mandate MAiD in all health facilities. The report notes that “institutional objection to MAiD resulting in patient transfers is a fraught issue. Since the legalization of MAiD in 2016, several faith-based hospitals, long-term care facilities, and hospices in Canada have enacted policies to prohibit MAiD from taking place on their premises,” further noting that a relatively high proportion of transfers were made following institutional policies. However, their analysis fails to acknowledge that transfers from facilities with institutional policies are necessary to enable individuals with disabilities to choose care in MAiD-free safe spaces. Further, hospital transfers occur frequently and for a variety of reasons, including patients requiring specialized services. Framing this as a “fraught issue” seemingly reflects ideological bias.
The Health Canada report seems to support removing "safeguards" for euthanasia.
Several disability organizations, supported by the larger disability community, have launched a court challenge to try to limit MAiD. The organizations assert that Track 2 has resulted in premature deaths and an increase in discrimination and stigma towards people with disabilities across the country. While they are not challenging Track 1 in this case, they recognize that it too can pose significant problems for people with disabilities.

Health Canada suggests that even modest delays can interfere with a person’s ability to access MAiD, emphasizing how important it is to avoid hindrances for those seeking it. However, they equally fail to highlight that 41 cases were stopped because external pressures were identified that were driving patients’ requests. In this regard, the report misses a critical point: providers who take the time to deeply understand and address a patient’s suffering may be offering true medical care, even if the patient dies naturally. Euthanasia and assisted suicide, as universal solutions, is a simplistic, cost-effective approach that overlooks the many complexities and challenges that their broad legalization has created.
Coelho completes her commentary by calling for a truly compassionate response.
Compassion does not abandon people to their despair. It does not normalize death as a solution to poorly controlled pain, fear, poverty, loneliness, or inadequate care. It invests in palliative care, mental health services, social support, and community life to make life worth living.

If Canada continues down this path, we are de facto normalizing the idea that some lives are less valuable and less deserving of care and that certain types of people are better off dead. The promise of autonomy can be a front, masking systemic neglect while utilizing the language of choice. Euthanasia and assisted suicide are not compassionate solutions if we have failed to meaningfully address the causes of suffering at its root. A compassionate society does not encourage its citizens to choose death simply because it has failed to help them live.
Previous articles by Ramona Coelho:

  • Discrimination driven deaths. Analysing Ontario Coroner Reports on Euthanasia (Link). 
  • Heart wrenching lessons from Canada's euthanasia regime (Link).
  • Canadians with disabilities are needlessly dying by euthanasia (Link).

Friday, October 11, 2024

Is euthanasia part of palliative care?

Alex Schadenberg
Executive Director, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition

Dr Harvey Chochinov and Dr Joseph Fins have written an excellent article that was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) on October 8 titled: Is Medical Assistance in Dying Part of Palliative Care?

The authors are actually asking the question whether or not MAiD, better known as euthanasia, is a part of medical treatment and therefore can be part of palliative care. The problem is that in many jurisdictions, where it is legal, MAiD is already considered as part of palliative care.

The authors begin the article by stating that most national palliative care organizations, including the Canadian Palliative Care Association, believe that MAiD does not fall within the practise of palliative care. The authors therefore determine the purpose of this article is:
to determine whether MAID is part of palliative care, based on characteristics embedded within the practice of medicine.

Dr Harvey Chochinov
The first question the authors examine is whether or not MAiD is part of medicine? The authors examine this question based on the four canons of therapy as defined by Thomas et al. which are: restoration, means-end proportionality, parsimony and discretion.

Concerning restorative measures the authors conclude:

It is hard to conceive of MAID as restorative because the very act makes any return impossible.
Concerning means-end proportionality, the authors conclude:

It is difficult to regard death as “well-fitted” because nonexistence negates alternative means to address pain. Death cannot be titrated and trialed; hence, it does not qualify as a therapeutic, which means its pursuit resides outside the realm of medicine.
Concerning parsimony, the authors conclude:
This tailoring of a therapy to a specific condition, drawing on evidence based guidelines, is violated under MAID, where patient preference effectively dictates practice. By way of example, Canadians seeking MAID are under no obligation to try other treatments they deem unacceptable. In those instances, physicians may have to dispense with parsimony—despite their clinical judgment pointing toward other options—yielding to the patient’s intent on receiving MAID.
Dr Joseph Fins
Concerning discretion, the authors conclude:

Discretion “counsels that an awareness of the limits of medical knowledge and practice should guide all treatment decisions.” Since MAID was launched in Canada, eligibility has broadened from those whose deaths are reasonably foreseeable, to individuals who are not dying but living with disability; with consideration now being given to mental illness, children, and those anticipating the loss of mental capacity. Although some may see this as affirming individual autonomy, ethicist Paul Ramsey reminds us that physicians must recognize that the function of medicine is not to relieve the human condition of the human condition.
The authors then examine the Patient-Physician Relationship and conclude:

MAID undermines the patient-physician relationship by violating the principle of nonabandonment, even when it is well intended. At the height of patients’ distress, MAID truncates care and eliminates the possibility of healing. This distinguishes it from palliative medicine, which embraces patient and family at life’s end with fidelity and relationality extending into bereavement care for survivors.
The authors then MAiD, Hope and Palliative care and conclude:
It is impossible to sustain this therapeutic stance when assessing a patient’s readiness for MAID. The former (palliative care) entails holistic medical care, whereas the latter shifts to a legalistic paradigm centered on determining eligibility for MAID.
The authors then examine MAiD in relation to policy considerations and state:
The policy arguments separating MAID and palliative care are rooted in the notion that palliative care affirms life, regards dying as a normal process, and is committed to “neither hasten nor postpone death.” Organizations representing palliative care have been resolute in asserting that MAID falls beyond their mandate.
Chochinov and Fins have provided excellent arguments and prove that MAiD is not a medical treatment and thus it cannot be part of palliative care.

Nonetheless, in many jurisdictions, including Canada, MAiD is administered as if it is part of palliative care. One problem is that health care administrators, within the government and on a regional basis, have implemented euthanasia, which is the killing of a patient upon request, as if it were medical treatment.

The goal of medical researchers, such as Chochinov and Fins, must be to convince the medical administrators that MAiD is not a part of medicine and, if legal, it needs to be separated from services that actually constitute medical treatment, such as palliative care.

Wednesday, January 3, 2024

Canada must put the brakes on euthanasia for mental illness.

Alex Schadenberg
Executive Director, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition

Dr Harvey Chochinov, the well known professor of psychiatrist from the University of Manitoba and the developer of dignity therapy, wrote an article that was published in the National Post on December 30, 2023 titled: Intensive compassionate caring - not MAiD - is the most effective way to address mental illness.

Chochinov is responding to the fact that Canada has approved the extension of euthanasia to people with mental illness alone, to begin on March 17, 2024. Chochinov is also referring to the government's Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying which will release a report this month concerning euthanasia for mental illness alone.

Chochinov writes:
It’s time to put the brakes on Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in Canada for those whose sole underlying medical condition is mental illness.

The federal government has tasked the Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying to determine if Canada is ready to extend MAID eligibility, starting in March 2024, to patients with mental illness alone. Despite those convinced it is time, and safe, to launch what amounts to ‘psychiatric euthanasia,’ the special committee must pay attention to a murmur of protest that has grown to a roar: Ottawa, we’ve got a problem.
Chochinov offers two key reasons why euthanasia should not be done to people with mental illness. His first key reason:
Current MAID eligibility requires a person have a grievous and irremediable medical condition. Unlike some cancers, and many neurodegenerative disorders, no mental disorder can be described as irremediable. To be sure, there are individuals whose mental affliction won’t improve, despite myriad treatments or psychosocial interventions. But there is currently no way to predict which patients won’t get better.

Studies of prognostic accuracy show psychiatrists are wrong half the time. I have cared for patients struggling with chronic suicidality; patients I worried might one day take their lives. I recall a woman with mind-numbing depression, who teetered precariously between life and death. One day, after years of countless drug trials, hospitalizations, electroconvulsive therapy, and various psychosocial interventions, she arrived for her appointment — three weeks into starting a new antidepressant — with a grin on her face.

“The door is purple” she declared. I told her the door had always been purple, to which she replied, “I know, but now I care.”

Before that moment, no one — not me, not her friends or family and not anyone on The Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying, nor any MAID assessor — could have predicted her recovery.
Chochinov then states that Intensive, unwavering, compassionate care and caring — not MAID — offers the most effective way to address this kind of suffering.

Chochinov continues with his second key reason:
The other reason not to launch psychiatric euthanasia is our inability to determine suicidality from those requesting MAID whose sole underlying medical condition is mental illness. According to the Canadian Association for Suicide Prevention, someone not dying because of their condition, such as a mental disorder alone, seeking death is, by definition, suicidal. 

Similarly, the first item listed by the American Association of Suicidology differentiating physician hastened death and suicide is the patient must be dying. That certainly does not characterize patients who are mentally ill.
The euthanasia expansionists told the Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying that “suicidality and having a reason to want to die are not at all the same.” 
Chochinov responds by stating:
We can say 'six' and ‘half-dozen' are not the same as many times as we like. If we repeat it frequently, consistently and without equivocation, it might even sound convincing, but that doesn't make it true.

Patients struggling with suicidality often have a reason to want to die, based on, for example, self-loathing, feeling a burden or becoming worn down pursuing care and support that could sustain them. In those instances, the line between MAID and suicide simply vanishes.
Chochinov states that proponents of euthanasia claim that it's discriminatory to  euthanasia for mental illness. Chochinov responds:
Avoiding discrimination does not mean everyone is treated the same, but rather, that everyone gets equal access to what they need to thrive.
Finally, Chochinov responds to the question of when euthanasia for mental illness can be launched by stating:
Time and again, committee members have asked witnesses when Canada’s psychiatric euthanasia program can be launched. I would suggest they behave like NASA. When a potentially catastrophic problem is identified before blast-off, space engineers don’t set an arbitrary new launch date, no more so than Health Canada announces a random release date of a new drug discovered to have unacceptable side-effects.
Chochinov concludes his article by stating:
Ottawa, we have a problem.

The federal government would be well advised to scrap this mission. But if it insists on moving forward, launch should proceed only when the problems are solved, and not a moment sooner.
Links to previous article by Dr Harvey Chochinov:
Patient centred care - Not death hastening (Link).

Friday, March 4, 2022

Harvey Chochinov: Patient centred care - not death hastening.

Alex Schadenberg
Executive Director, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition.

Dr Harvey Chochinov
Dr Harvey Chochinov is a leading Canadian medical researcher who is known for his studies on the Will to Live and the development of Dignity Therapy to ensure a true death with dignity. The Euthanasia Prevention Coalition recognizes the importance of Dignity Therapy.

On February 25, Chochinov wrote a paradigm shifting article that was published as a guest editorial in the Journal of Palliative Medicine titled: The Platinum Rule: A New Standard for Patient-Centred Care

In his article Chochinov suggests that The Platinum Rule, which would have us consider doing unto patients as they would want done unto themselves, may be a more appropriate standard for achieving optimal person-centered care than the Golden Rule.

Chochinov provides this story to illustrate his point:

Bert was a kind 74-year-old happily married gentleman and father of five children. He had smoked cigarettes for a few decades, but had quit years ago, yet had presented with a cancer in his mouth. He underwent a large surgery that left him hoarse and disfigured. He was unable to swallow and depended on a gastrostomy tube for his feedings. Chemotherapy and radiation took their turns in causing more difficulties with nausea and some painful radiation effects.

Eventually the cancer recurred. More chemotherapy did not affect the tumor, and radiation was given with palliative intent. He began to have more pain, and at that point, one of his oncologists sat down with him and his wife and told them that he likely had little time to live, that his tumor was most likely going to progress quickly, and that his last days would become much more difficult, with increasing pain. The oncologist suggested that he might consider Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD), to avoid what was sure to be a time of significant suffering.

Bert and his wife were a religious couple who had relied on prayer and the community around them to get them through over the years. They could not agree to MAiD. It was just not on their list of potential options. When he met with the palliative care consultant, he was having increasing pain, which was felt to have a large neuropathic component. A mix of gabapentin and small doses of methadone helped to reduce his pain to a very manageable level. The addition of immunotherapy by another oncologist resulted in a surprisingly good outcome, and now six months later, although still depending on gastrostomy feedings, he is frequently out in the garden, watering and weeding, and hoping to take part in harvest. He recently indicated his quality of life was excellent (C. Woelk, pers. comm.).

Bert was offered MAiD (euthanasia) because the physician percieved his quality of life to be poor, that Bert was better off dying than suffering or even attempting to find a way to keep Bert comfortable in his remaining days.

Chochinov explains how the Golden Rule may have weaknesses in our ethically diverse culture:

The Golden Rule—do unto others as you would have them do unto you—conveys deep wisdom, which can be found in some form in many religious and ethical traditions. In medicine this means treating patients and families the way we would want to be treated or would want our loved ones to be treated in similar circumstances. The Golden Rule is based on the idea of reciprocity and being able to see ourselves in others. If I were that patient, how would I want to be treated? What if this was my spouse, my child, my parent or sibling, how would I want them to be treated? In most instances adherence to The Golden Rule leads to health care decisions and clinical attitudes that are compassionate and embrace the essence of person-centered care.

The Golden Rule, however, has its limitations, as it requires some overlap between how we see ourselves and how others see themselves. So long as the patient's values and priorities align with our own, we can infer their needs based on how we would want to be treated in their situation. The more our worldview and lived experience deviates from theirs, the more the Golden Rule begins to unravel. How would I want to be treated it I were that old? If I were that dependent? Or that disabled, disfigured, marginalized, or disease ridden? Our own biases and perceptions of current, and the possibility of future, suffering can lead to attitudes that are tone deaf and decisions that are discordant with patients' perceptions, values, and goals.

Chochinov acknowledges that people who are very old, dependent, disabled, disfigured, marginalized or disease ridden may not be well served by the Golden Rule. Medical care-givers have their biases, perceptions and attitudes that lead to decisions that do not fit the patients values and goals. People with disabilities have often experienced this form of discrimination.

Chochinov continues by recognizing how the perceptions of the medical team will affect the patient.

Unconscious bias can influence the way we process patient information, affecting our behavior, interactions, and decision making. A sense of therapeutic nihilism and clinical passivity can set in, a feeling that nothing is worth trying and certain lives may not be worth preserving, leading us to withhold treatment, perhaps forgo diagnostic tests and let nature take its course. Inferring we would not want to live this way, distorted compassion—that is compassion based on tainted or inaccurate perceptions of another person's suffering—can lead to ostensibly well-intended advice, actions, or inactions that may be completely at odds with what the patient really wants. Rather than feeling that they have been heard, distorted compassion can result in patients feeling devalued, misunderstood, and further demoralized at the very hands of those who are meant to help.

Catherine Frazee
To provide greater clarity, Chochinov quotes disability rights advocate Catherine Frazee:

Catherine Frazee, a pre-eminent disability rights advocate, who lives with spinal muscular atrophy says, “having to wear diapers and drooling are highly stigmatized departures from what is expected of adult bodies. Those of us who deviate from these norms experience social shame and stigma that erodes resilience and increases vulnerably. The more deeply these stigmatized accounts are embedded in our discourse and social policy, the more deeply virulent social prejudice takes hold within our culture.

Chochinov then explains how the Platinum rule leads to better patient care. He writes:

The Platinum Rule, which would have us consider—doing unto patients as they would want done unto themselves—offers a standard that is more likely to result in treatment decisions that are consistent with patients' personal needs and objectives. Doing unto as per the Platinum Rule implicates not only clinical decisions, but treating patients—as in acting toward them—as they would want to be treated. This means establishing a care tenor that is informed by asking what we need to know about them as a person to take the best care of them possible.

Chochinov concludes by referring back to his Bert's story:

...one can easily imagine Bert's physician recommending MAiD from a position of wanting to mitigate current and future suffering. One can also easily imagine, based on the Golden Rule, that he offered a solution for a clinical situation he could neither fathom himself nor those he loved being able to bear. Distorted compassion, however, represents a failure of the imagination. Perceptions of suffering can obstruct our ability to imagine patients experiencing life as having sustained meaning, purpose, and value, despite even overwhelming challenges. The Golden Rule has its place in medicine, given it provides an initial gauge in our response to patient suffering. But if we are truly intent on offering patient-centered care, consistent with their values, preferences, and goals, consideration of the Platinum Rule is required: doing unto patients as they would want done unto themselves.

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