The following post is part of a
structured, multi-week, simultaneously published exchange between Kim Carlson
and Paul Magennis, authors of MAiD in Canada, and Gordon Friesen, President of
the Euthanasia Prevention Coalition. These alternating messages will
explore deeply divergent views on Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD), and no
mutual endorsement is implied.
Previously published
instalments have been:
Gordon Friesen, Monday, January 12, 2026.
Maid in Canada (MIC)
January 19, 2026.
Gordon Friesen
January 26, 2026.
Maid in Canada (MIC) February 2, 2026
Gordon Friesen
January 26, 2026 .
On Capacity and Its Absence:
How a Structured Exchange Became a Masterclass in Deflection
When Friesen approached us about a
multi-week exchange, he was clear, “my interest is to get my point of view
published on your blog.” Congratulations, you achieved exactly that. Your point
of view was published, repeatedly, even when it wandered well outside the
agreed-upon topics.
What was supposed to be a structured,
good-faith discussion became a showcase in dehumanizing statements, diversions,
and inaccurate use of references. Instead of engaging with the arguments
directly, Friesen took off-topic detours and then claimed there was
"insufficient space” to address the actual issue.
If the objective was simply to use our
platform as a megaphone while avoiding meaningful scrutiny, then mission
accomplished. But let’s be clear, avoiding thoughtful and respectful discussion
is not a position of strength. It’s what you do when you are trying to protect
your narrative.
Back to our regularly — or perhaps
chaotically — scheduled program
We will complete this (un)structured
“exchange” by attempting to respond to this latest post and hopefully close off
this discussion back at the agreed upon topic.
Friesen begins his final contribution
by conceding that he and Kelsi Sheren “have a natural connection, because we
are both eligible” for MAiD, a claim he repeats multiple times. Eligibility,
however, is not self-declared. It is determined following a voluntary request,
informed consent, and assessment by two independent clinicians. If neither of
them has undergone that process, then repeatedly describing themselves as
“eligible” is, at best, speculative — and at worst, misleading.
Upon learning that we redacted some of
his post Friesen stated in an email that he and Sheren “have an earned
experiential right to discuss suicide in ways that (we) would not be
comfortable with.” Based on this post and his email, he appears to believe that
medical conditions and lived experiences grant them both freedom to speak about
suicide and MAiD in whatever terms they choose. Lived experience deserves
respect. But it does not grant immunity from responsibility and accountability,
nor does it place anyone beyond critique. Yet his latest contribution suggests
he views them both as members of a protected class of experience — one that
must never be challenged, corrected, or, in his words, “censored,” regardless
of how reckless and dangerous their statements may be.
“Pet theory of Carter”
We are not entirely certain, but it
appears that Friesen’s reference to “pet theory of Carter” is directed at our
statement that “Uncertainty is not justification for categorical exclusion, and
arguments of this kind have already been considered and rejected by the Supreme
Court of Canada.” In doing so, he seems to suggest that reliance on Carter
v. Canada[1]
is inadequate or irrelevant when assessing the constitutionality of categorical
exclusions.
The constitution and the courts would disagree. In
Canada, the evolution of MAiD has and will continue to be shaped by individuals
with lived experience bringing Charter challenges before the courts. As a
reminder to Friesen, Carter did not explicitly exclude any
particular group. The federal government chose to restrict access only
to those whose natural deaths were reasonably foreseeable, thereby creating
categorical exclusion. Those exclusions were subsequently challenged in Truchon
v. Quebec, leading to the passage of Bill C-7.[2]
As a result, individuals whose deaths are not reasonably foreseeable are no
longer excluded from accessing MAiD.
The evolution of MAiD follows a clear
constitutional pattern: exclusions are tested against the Charter, and where
they cannot be justified, they fall. In addition, the courts have consistently
rejected fear and speculative concerns as sufficient justification for a
complete prohibition. To characterize this constitutional trajectory as a “pet
theory” is to dismiss not merely our position, but the jurisprudential path
that has defined the legal framework itself.
The next charter challenge
John Scully is 84 years old and has
lived with PTSD for approximately 30 years.[3]
He has described the persistence of his symptoms in stark terms: “Every
single night of my life now I get nightmares, horrific nightmares. It doesn’t
stop.”[4]
He has spoken publicly about decades of treatment and has acknowledged two
prior suicide attempts. His condition stems from nearly 50 years as a war
correspondent covering 36 war zones.
Scully, along with Claire Elyse
Brousseau, have launched a constitutional challenge seeking to end the
exclusion of individuals whose sole underlying medical condition is a mental
illness.[5]
Once again, history appears to follow a familiar constitutional path driven by
individuals with lived experience.
The constitutional question is not
about whether uncertainty exists in psychiatric prognostication or capacity
assessments. The question is whether uncertainty or moral opposition can
withstand constitutional scrutiny as a basis for denying Scully and an entire
class of competent adults even the opportunity to be assessed for MAiD. If fear
is insufficient to justify categorical exclusion in one context, it does not
become constitutionally sufficient simply because the suffering is psychiatric
rather than physical. “We all must demand that we mentally ill will be accorded
identical human rights as the physically ill, with access to MAiD on the very
same conditions that they have.”[6]
Conclusion
We agreed to this exchange on the
understanding that it would be thoughtful, respectful, and focused on the
agreed-upon topics. Rather than continuing to talk past one another, we saw it
as an opportunity to engage directly in each of our concerns and differing
opinions, and give readers a genuine chance to consider both views.
However, at the announcement of this
exchange, Friesen stated, “the more public interest which is stimulated, the
more, we believe, that our own positions will gain traction.”[7]
By his own framing, this was never about engaging meaningfully with complex
ethical and clinical questions. It appears his purpose was amplification and
spectacle. It was an opportunity for him to rail against MAiD before an
audience that may not ordinarily engage with his work.
He also seemed to think this was
something to be won — a “cage fight,” even a “battle of the titans,” as he put
it in one of our email exchanges. From his perspective, it was a contest, with
readers cast as spectators rather than participants in a careful and principled
dialogue. What could have been a meaningful exchange between individuals with
opposing views was instead turned into a battleground.
Discussions about MAiD — particularly
where mental illness is the sole underlying medical condition — require good
faith, intellectual humility, and genuine seriousness. Mr. Friesen’s approach
to this exchange was, in our view, fundamentally unserious.
Readers deserve better.
References
[3] Scully, John. Am I Dead Yet?: 71 Countries, 36 War Zones, One Man's
Opinion. Fitzhenry & Whiteside Ltd, 2008.
